Conceivability and Possibility Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne
Publisher: Clarendon Press

Often in philosophy a priori methods are used to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary. A short argument against the notion of ideal conceivability: Our limited apriori-reasoning skills open a gap between our finding a proposition (in)conceivable and its metaphysical (im)possibility. I was merely arguing that dualism is conceivable, but may not be possible. So I guess I have to deny that every conceivable thing is possible. I can conceive of a lot of stuff. My original post argues against that. According to inconceivability maxims, a kind of inconceivability is a guide to impossibility. Zombie (Photo credit: Irregular Shed). According to conceivability maxims, a kind of conceivability is a guide to possibility. However, I do not believe such a thing to be a possibility. On another point you are commiting a fallacy. These are those that are remote and our mere imagining of it doesn't constitute a possibility. We might call this a mere conceptual possibility.) I agree that not all conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities. But it seems in some sense conceivable. Some may argue that conceivability equals possibility. Conceivability & Possibility - A priori & A posteriori.